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Introducing genetically modified foods in 
vertically differentiated and vertically oligopolistic markets 
 
1. Introduction 
  In recent years many countries have adapted Labelling Food Policies regarding 
Genetically Modified (GM) products but the applied regimes differ widely across the 
world (Gruere, 2004). The great difference lies between the European countries (EU) 
which have applied a mandatory food labelling regime and the United States (US) 
which has chosen not to impose such requirements and implement a voluntary food 
labelling policy. Accepting the need for a labelling policy still leaves open the 
problem of the adventitious presence (AP) thresholds or tolerance level which 
represents the maximum level of impurity in non-GM food. The EU countries adapted 
the most stringent policy requiring mandatory labelling for all foods produced from 
GM ingredients regardless of whether or not the final product contains any sign of 
GM material. Meanwhile, to avoid carrying a GM label the EU countries set the AP 
thresholds to 0,9% which, to date, is considered the lowest GM allowance. Japan 
requires labelling for food products that contain more than 5% GM material (top three 
ingredients), followed by South Korea which requires labelling at the level of 3% AP 
thresholds (top five ingredients) ( Gruere,2003; Lapan and Moschini, 2006). 
  Even though the differences in these AP thresholds look insignificant, they 
affect the production cost and segregation cost of non-GM products; while the AP 
thresholds increase (decrease) the non-GM production cost decreases (increases) 
(Kalaitzandonakes and Magnier, 2004). Additionally, consumers´ evaluation of both 
GM and non-GM foods are affected by a change in AP thresholds (Noussair et al., 
2004; Giannakas and Kalaitzandonakes, 2005). As a result, both consumer and 
producer welfare are affected by the change in AP thresholds, hence considering the 
effect that the food industry has in the entire economy, undoubtedly AP thresholds 
play a significant role for policy makers. Thus, from an economic perspective AP 
thresholds affect consumer and producer welfare (Fulton and Giannakas, 2004; Lapan 
and Moschini, 2005/ 2006; Giannakas and Kalaitzandonakes, 2005). 
  The problem of the appropriate purity standards norm has been a topic of 
discussion since the 1980s and yet it remains a core issue (Giannakas and 
Kalaitzandonakes, 2005). While several studies (Giannakas and Fulton, 2002; Fulton 
and Giannakas, 2004,) refer to the GM issue, few of them (Lapan and Moschini, 
2006/ 2007, Giannakas and Yiannaka, 2008; Giannakas and Kalaitzandonakes, 2005) 
have addressed the issue of regulatory standards in oligopolistic suppliers. To our 
knowledge, none have address oligopoly/oligopsony market structure. 
  The work closest to ours is that of Lapan and Moschini (2007) and Giannakas 
and Kalaitzandonakes, (2005). The former is dealing with the purity standards issue 
by assuming a perfectly competitive market for the GM and non-GM products, while 
the latter introduces an oligopolistic market. We extend Giannakas and 
Kalaitzandonakes, (2005) by introducing a conjectural variations oligopoly model 
similar to Sexton and Zhang (2001).  
  The aim of this paper is to determine the effects of purity standards of non-GM 
products on suppliers´ and consumers´ welfare under vertical oligopoly. In particular, 
our analysis accounts for the allowance of GM material in non-GM foods. By 
deriving the equilibrium quantities and prices, comparing and contrasting them, 
before and after changing the AP thresholds we show analytically the market and 
welfare effects of AP thresholds. Specifically, the following key components 
characterise our model: introducing genetically modified foods in vertically differentiated and vertically oligopolistic markets 
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a. heterogeneous consumers with preferences toward GM and non-GM foods  
b. heterogeneous production costs of both GM and non-GM products. 
c. market power exercised in the supply chain for both GM and non-GM food  
2. Vertical Product Differentiation 
  The vertically differentiated consumer premise is that, whereas GM and non-
GM products are offered at the same price, they will never choose the GM product. 
Meanwhile, some consumers are willing to pay some extra money to avoid GM food. 
Lapan and Moschini (2004) have provided that the GM product is a weak inferior 
substitute for the non-GM counterpart. In vertical differentiation, all consumers agree 
upon the quality ranking of the products from the highest to the lowest. If two 
vertically differentiated goods are offered at the same price, all consumers will buy 
the high quality good driving the low quality good out of the market. Lower quality 
products will realize a positive market share only if they are offered at a sufficiently 
lower price. However, consumers differ in their willingness to pay for a better 
perceived quality. Some consumers place a high value on quality and will pay a 
considerable premium to consume a high quality product while some others do not. In 
other words consumers examine the ratio price- quality and the utility obtained from 
the offered product, deciding to buy it in case the utility is greater than the price being 
charged and just refuse to buy it if the opposite is true. On the other hand, horizontally 
differentiated products are not uniform quality ranked. If two horizontally 
differentiated products are offered at the same price, the consumer will not agree on 
what the best quality is, and so both products will be demanded in the market. 
 2.1 Consumer Characteristics  
  We assume that consumers spend a specific amount of their income for food. 
Then, the utility they gain by consuming these foods will be as follows: 
 
 
where: 
• Ugm and Ungm are the utilities associated with consuming a unit of GM and non-
GM unit, respectively; 
• Us is the utility associated with the consumption of a unit of substitute products 
neither of which are GM nor non-GM products. Specifically, Us represents a 
certain utility level which is considered equal to a basic level of utility. In 
order to ensure a positive utility associated with the consumption of 
different products, Us  exceeds the prices of GM and non-GM and is 
common to all consumers; 
• Pgm and Pngm are the prices of GM and non-GM products, respectively, while 
parameters    and µ capture the utility enhancement from consuming GM 
and non-GM foods, respectively;  
• α captures the heterogeneity in consumer preferences. Its value ranges from 0 to 
1 and consumers are assumed to be uniformly distributed at the extremes. 
(1) introducing genetically modified foods in vertically differentiated and vertically oligopolistic markets 
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• U+  and    indicate consumer willingness to pay for GM and non-GM 
products, while (µ- ) α reflects the level of aversion toward GM products 
of the consumers with attribute α. 
Consumer purchasing decisions depend on the utility they gain by consuming certain 
products. The greater the enhancement utility they gain by consuming a specific 
product, the greater the demand or consumption of that product. It is important to 
point out that a consumer with an α=0 is indifferent in consuming one unit of 
substitute, GM or non-GM products.  
  As illustrated in Figure 1, the level of the attribute corresponding to the 
indifferent consumer is determined by the intersection of the two utility curves. In our 
case, the consumer with the differentiating attribute: αs: Ugm=Us ֲU-Pgm+λα=U ֲ αs 
=    is indifferent in consuming either a GM product or the substitute one. On the 
other hand, the consumer with the differentiating attributes: αgm: Ugm=Ungm ֲ U-
Pgm+ =U-Pngm+µα ֲ αgm= (Pngm-Pgm)/µ-λ is indifferent in consuming either one 
unit of a GM product or a non-GM product. As shown in Figure 1, consumers with a 
differentiating attribute {0,as} would rather have the substitute product, consumers 
located between {as,agm} prefer the GM products and consumers located in the 
interval {agm,1} prefer the organic counterpart. The consumption share of GM 
products is expressed as:  
ֲ    (2) 
While the consumption share for the non-GM products is: 
ֲ  (3) 
From equations (2) and (3) it is 
noticeable that, the higher the Pngm, the 
greater the quantity demanded for the 
GM products, and the higher the Pgm, 
the greater the demand for non GM 
products. In order to permit positive 
market share for both products, we 
assume that Pgm <Pngm and µ>λ. 
Consumer aversion is assumed to be 
greater than the price difference (µ-λ)> 
(Pngm-Pgm), otherwise (if the price 
difference is greater than consumer 
aversion), the non GM products would 
be eliminated from the market. The 
aggregate consumer surplus is the area under the effective utility curve depicted in 
Figure 1 by the dashed line and is written as: 
    (4) 
3. Oligopoly and Oligopsony 
The market power within a supply chain has impacts on market equilibrium and 
welfare distribution. Sexton and Zhang (2001) analyzed different market structures 
and showed that market power itself plays a considerable role in the equilibrium 
prices and outputs as well as on consumer and producer welfare. Similarly, in our 
model we consider a channel where two different products are produced from 
different farmers, procured then by different processors which transfer the final 
Figure 1: Vertically Differentiated Consumers´ choice introducing genetically modified foods in vertically differentiated and vertically oligopolistic markets 
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products to independent retailers, and here, the final product is offered to the same 
consumers.  Consumer inverse demand for the retail product is as follows: 
         (5) 
Where Xri  is the market quantity for both GM and non-GM products, and Pri is the 
market price for GM and non-GM foods, respectively. In order to focus the analysis 
on the possible implications of market power in the industry, we assume that both the 
processor and retailer of GM and non-GM products utilize both fixed-proportions and 
constant-returns technology in the processing or retailing process.  
  Throughout the analysis, consumers, farmers and processors are assumed to be 
price takers. Thus, we derive the implications of oligopoly/oligopsony power in the 
retailing sector, on market equilibriums and distribution of welfare among consumers, 
retailers and processors. 
3.1 Retailers´ Characteristics  
  This analysis accounts for heterogeneous production costs too. Retailers differ 
from each other in terms of the benefits they gain by producing a GM or non-GM 
product. Particularly, they differ in their earnings due to the differences in the total 
costs of both products introduced in the model as cgm and cngm. These differences stem 
from various factors such as geography, education, management skills and the 
technology adopted (Fulton and Gianakas 2004).The production and segregation cost 
that a GM supplier faces is smaller than the one that a non-GM supplier does. 
Subsequently, we show the objective function which maximizes benefits for both GM 
and non-GM suppliers. Retailers’ prices, as mentioned earlier, are assumed to be a 
linear function expressed as Pri = a- b*Xri where i Є {GM, non-GM} and Xri = f(x1, 
x2...). A representative retailer’s profit maximization functions can be expressed as 
follows: 
   (6) 
Where Pr, Xr ,cr, and Pw  represent retailer price, quantity and cost, and the processor 
price respectively. In our model we assume oligopsony market power exercised over 
processors, expressing the Pw as a function of the Xr. Exploring the profit 
maximization function of the processors, which are assumed to be price takers, we 
define the Pw as equal to the processor marginal cost. We follow the same approach 
as Fulton and Giannakas (2004) assuming a positive and constant marginal cost for 
GM and non GM processors. 
Consumers’ inverse demands are derived by solving equations (2) and (3) for Pgm and 
Pngm. 
     (7) 
 (8) 
Using consumers inverse demands, equation (7) for the GM product and equation (8) 
for the Non-GM product, we can write the GM and Non-GM retailer’s profit function 
as follow: 
   (9) 
 (10) 
Equations (9) and (10) solved for the Xgm and Xngm  respectively give us the GM and 
Non-GM supplied quantity expressed as: 
   (11) 
   (12) introducing genetically modified foods in vertically differentiated and vertically oligopolistic markets 
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where: 
 ; {i=gm, ngm} is the conjectural elasticity capturing in our analysis 
the market power exercised in the supply chain. It takes on values between 0 
(perfect competition) to 1 (monopoly) (Sexton and Zhang, 2001). 
 ; {i=gm, ngm} represent the oligopsony market power. It takes on 
values between 0 (perfect competition) to 1 (monopoly) 
cgm and cngm are the marginal costs of GM and non-GM products, respectively, 
faced by the processors of these products. crgm and crngm represent the retailers 
additional costs for both GM and Non-GM products respectively. 
Equations (11) and (12) indicate that the supplied products Xgm and Xngm, are in the 
right proportion with the opposite prices. The greater the Pgm the greater the quantity 
of non-GM product supplied and the greater the Pngm, the greater the quantity of GM 
products supplied.  
The simultaneous solution of Equations 2, 3, 11, 12 results in the following closed-
form solutions: 
   (13) 
   (14) 
 (15) 
       (16) 
Some comparative static results are indicative: An increase either in market power or 
in marginal costs results in an increase in the prices of both GM and non-GM 
products. 
  ;   ;     for i, j  ￿{gm, ngm}  (17) 
but the change in  i, ξi, ci affects Pi more than Pj , hence: 
      ;     .   (18) 
On the other hand, the greater   is, the lower Xi will be, and the greater the 
counterpart product X j is:   ; .   (19) 
The more market power the retailers have, the smaller the equilibrium quantity they 
have to produce and higher the price they charge selling it. Similarly, as ci increases 
Xi decreases while the quantity of Xj increases: 
.       (20) 
4. Simulation results of market and welfare effects after change of purity 
standards  
  We conduct a simulation analysis in order to display all the possible market and 
welfare effects of AP thresholds. Our benchmark is zero AP thresholds; furthermore, 
we assume the non-GM products as not being 100 % pure. That is, non-GM products 
are allowed to contain up to a certain adventitious presence of GM material. Increased 
purity standards decrease the production cost and the non-GM food utility as well. It introducing genetically modified foods in vertically differentiated and vertically oligopolistic markets 
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is assumed that processing costs will be lower as a more adventitious presence is 
allowed. The cost of non-GM products before and after changing the purity standards 
will be cngm and c´ngm, respectively, where: c´ngm < cngm. However, producing non-GM 
products with a certain GM allowance is less preferred by the consumers. Utility 
enhancement for the non-GM products before and after changing the purity standards 
will be µ and µ´, respectively, where µ´<µ. The equilibrium conditions after changing 
the purity standards can be derived by substituting µ´ and c´ngm for µ and cngm. 
Specifically, when the AP thresholds change the non-GM products’ utility decreases, 
and this is shown as follows:  
µ´=µ* (1 - ue)       (21) 
Where ue represents the utility effect of an increase in AP thresholds, µ´ is the utility 
enhancement of non-GM foods after the increase of purity standards. ue takes on a 
value from 0 to 1 (0 < ue < 1), where 0 captures zero change in utility enhancement of 
Non-GM products ( that means after AP thresholds increase, non-GM products offer 
exactly the same utility enhancement),  and 1 captures  the highest  increase in AP 
thresholds (in the case where after AP thresholds increase, Non-GM products offer 
zero utility enhancement). The greater the amount of GM allowance (the greater the 
AP thresholds), the higher the ue, resulting in a smaller u`.   
The cost effect of an increase in AP thresholds is given by: 
cngm´=cngm* (1 - c e)       (22) 
Where ce represents the non-GM production cost effect of an increase in AP 
thresholds, which ranges from  0 to 1 (0 < ce < 1). Similarly, ce= 0 indicates the case 
of no change in the AP thresholds, while 1 represents the highest GM allowance. The 
greater the AP thresholds, the greater the ce and as a result the lower the cngm'  
The assumptions followed throughout the analysis are: 
I.    
II.   
III.   
IV.         (23) 
  Given these assumptions, it is possible for both GM and Non-GM products to 
have a positive market share. In addition, respecting constraints I-IV above, we 
invoke the normalizations that are available without loss of generality by choosing 
units so that: 
 ,  , ,    (24) 
4.1 AP Threshold Effects on Consumer Welfare 
Mathematically we derive the GM and Non-GM consumers’ welfare as follows: 
   (25) 
     (26) 
From equations (25) and (26) it follows that consumers´ surplus increases as the price 
of the counterpart product increases (i.e., GM consumer surplus increases while the 
price of Non-GM products (PEngm) increases and the price of GM products (PEgm) 
decreases).  One reason is that some consumers may give up buying a perceived 
expensive product and so they substitute it for a more reasonable one. A consumer 
will move towards non-GM products in the case where the AP thresholds affect the introducing genetically modified foods in vertically differentiated and vertically oligopolistic markets 
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production cost more than the utility. While moving towards the GM products, the AP 
thresholds reduce the utility of Non-GM products more than their production cost.  
The left panel of Figure 2, shows that Non-GM consumers, (those who have high 
aversion towards GM foods) are highly affected by the changes of the utility 
enhancement of the Non-GM. We see that a small change in the utility enhancement 
is highly affecting the consumer welfare. On the other hand the decrease in the non-
GM production cost seems not to affect that much the Non-GM consumer welfare. A 
big change in the Non-GM cost is slightly affecting consumers’ welfare.  
  As shown in the right panel of Figure 2, consumers who find it optimal to 
consume GM products are highly affected by the changes in the production cost of the 
Non-GM products and very slightly affected by the changes of the Non-GM utility 
enhancement. For those consumers who have a low aversion towards GM foods lose 
surplus when the Non-GM products became less expensive and they don’t benefit 
from the decrease on the Non-GM utility enhancement. 
 
4.2 AP Threshold Effects on Retailer Welfare 
  In our model, retailers are assumed to have a constant marginal cost, which as 
previously mentioned, is introduced in the model as cgm/ngm for both GM and Non-GM 
products. Mathematically retailers´ surpluses are defined as follows: 
 
    (27) 
 (28) 
  It follows from equations (27) and (28) that retailers´ surplus increase as the 
price of their products increases. However, as we have mentioned above the prices of 
GM and Non-GM products are strategic complements. Thus, both prices move 
towards the same direction (either increase or decrease), but the percentage change is 
not equal for both products. The results on welfare are shown in Figure 2. 
  Non-GM retailers are highly affected by the changes in both utility 
enhancement and the production cost of the Non-GM products. Their benefits depend 
on the magnitude of the AP thresholds effects in both utility and cost production. If 
the AP thresholds affect more the utility than the cost of the Non-GM foods then the 
Non-GM retailers will lose profits. Conversely if the AP thresholds affect more the 
cost of the Non-GM than their utility, the Non-GM retailers benefit. 
  GM retailers lose benefits when the Non-GM products become cheaper, and 
they experience a slight increase in their benefits when the utility of the Non-GM 
foods decreases. Due to lack of space we can not show all the graphs, however, we 
have calculated that in case the AP thresholds affect more the Non-GM cost the 
retailers of the GM products face a great loss of their profits. In case the AP 
thresholds affect more the utility of the Non-GM products, the GM retailers gain 
small benefits. 
4.3 Market power effects on Consumer Welfare 
  Market power has negative effects on consumer welfare. In the following 
figures we try to depict the way consumers are affected by both, upstream and 
downstream market power. Space limitations do not allow us to show detailed results. 
The more market power is exercised in the supply chain, the more consumers lose 
surplus. Similarly to (Sexton and Zhang, 2001), we claim that the market power 
decreases consumer surplus. Particularly consumers lose welfare for paying higher 
prices for the same quality. introducing genetically modified foods in vertically differentiated and vertically oligopolistic markets 
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Figure 2. Effects of changing threshold levels on welfare 
 
  Differently from consumers’ welfare effects, the market power raises retailers’ 
benefits. The control they exercise over the price makes them able to achieve higher  
profits. We do not show this result due to lack of space. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
  In this paper, a model of heterogeneous consumer preferences and 
heterogeneous retailer returns has been developed. The `pure` equilibrium prices and 
outputs correspond to a world where non-GM products are absolutely free of any GM 
material (GM allowance is zero).  In our analysis, we acknowledged that the way in 
which purity standards affect the market and welfare depends on the magnitude of 
cost and utility effects, as well as on the market structure. An increase in the AP 
threshold has been proven to affect the demand and supply by reducing consumer 
trends towards the non-GM foods as well as non-GM production and segregation cost. 
Potential winners and losers are determined among consumers and producers of both 
GM and non-GM products. The simulation analysis indicated how changes in Purity 
Thresholds, no matter how small, can drastically shift the distribution of welfare 
among consumers and retailers of GM and non-GM products. 
A key finding of this analysis is that changes, even though small, in AP thresholds do 
affect the equilibrium prices and quantities of both GM and non-GM products as well 
as consumers’ and producers´ welfare. The impacts of AP thresholds in the markets of 
GM and non-GM products are case- specific and depend on: 
1. the Non-GM product utility effect, 
2.  Non-GM production and segregation costs effect. 
3. θi, i ￿ { gm, ngm}- the downstream market power within the supply chain of 
GM and non-GM products 
4.  ξi, i ￿ { gm, ngm}- the upstream market power within the supply chain of GM 
and non-GM products. 
Non‐GM retailer surplus
µ
GM consumers’ welfare 
µ 
Cngm
Non GM consumers’ welfare
µ
Cngm 
Cngm 
GM retailer surplus 
µ  Cngmintroducing genetically modified foods in vertically differentiated and vertically oligopolistic markets 
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Specifically, consumers who have high aversion towards GM products are mostly 
affected by the changes in the utility enhancement. The changes in the Non-GM cost 
don’t influence them as much as the changes of the utility. These consumers are 
willing to pay a high price for ensuring their favorite quality. Similarly, the Non-GM 
retailers are affected highly by the changes in the utility and less affected by the price 
changes that result from the cost decrease. Consequently, the total surplus of the Non-
GM consumer and retailer is highly affected by the utility and les affected by the cost 
of the Non-GM foods (Figure 10). The simulation analysis concludes that Non-GM 
consumers and retailers: 
1. Lose surplus when the AP thresholds affect more the utility enhancement than 
the cost, ue > ce 
2. Lose surplus when the AP thresholds affect in the same way both utility and 
cost ue = ce 
3. Gain surplus when the AP thresholds affect the cost more than the utility ce > ue 
On the other hand, GM consumers and retailers are highly affected by the changes on 
the Non-GM prices and less affected by the changes in the Non-GM utility. They gain 
surplus when the Non-GM offer less utility and their cost is high. As a result the total 
surplus decreases when the Non-GM products become less expensive, while it 
increases when the Non-GM products become less enjoyable (Figure 11). GM 
consumers and retailers are affected as follow: 
1. Lose surplus when the AP thresholds affect more the cost than the utility ce > ue 
2. Gain surplus when the AP thresholds affect both cost and utility in the same 
way ue = ce 
3. Gain surplus when the AP thresholds affect the utility more than the cost ue > ce 
Another key factor we analyzed is the market power, the ways it affect 
consumer and retailer welfare. Sexton and Zhang 2001 have concluded that the 
market power exercised within the supply chain has positive effect in the retailers 
‘profits and negative effects in consumers ‘welfare. The total surpluses of both GM 
and Non-GM foods decrease as more market power is exercised within the supply 
chain. An increased oligopolistic or oligopsonic market power reduces the total 
welfare (Figure 12 and Figure 13).  
Based on our analysis we suggest that Europea authorities perhaps shouldn’t 
allow an increase of the AP thresholds. It is a fact that European consumers have a 
high aversion toward GM foods. An increase in the AP thresholds will make them 
giving up of buying those products, since they are not concerned about the lower 
prices as much as they are for the perceived high quality. These consumers are driven 
from the quality and that is what should not be affected. The businesses are also 
affected due to the lower demand for the Non-GM foods after the AP thresholds 
increase. Even though they control the market price, they lose profits due to the lower 
consumed quantity. introducing genetically modified foods in vertically differentiated and vertically oligopolistic markets 
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